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Abstract  
Drawing inspiration from the ancient Chinese proverb “寧為雞口，無為牛後” in Zhan Guo Ce [戰
國策], which means that “it is better to be the head of a small group than to hold a less powerful 
position in a large group,” this paper offers an alternative explanation to institution-building. The 
proposed theory is expected to shed light on institution-building not only in Asia-Pacific, but also 
all over the world. In theorizing institution-building, we put special emphasis on membership and 
leadership, which are intrinsically linked concepts. The key factor connecting the two concepts is 
“exclusion,” because exclusion of rivals is necessary in order for a state to become a leader. We 
hypothesize that a potential leader attempts to form a group from which more powerful states are 
excluded, in order to become an actual leader. Our main claim is that the creation of a regional 
group is an effective way to exclude rivals and become an actual leader. We will examine the 
explanatory power of Regional Group Formation Theory, using 33 cases of regional 
institution-building projects in Asia-Pacific since WWII. Our empirical investigations revealed three 
of Japan’s behavior patterns with regard to membership in regional groupings, strongly suggesting 
the validity of the proposed theory: (i) Japan does not support regional groups which include the 
US, because US presence limits Japan’s leadership opportunity (five out of six cases of groups 
including the US); (ii) Japan supports regional groups excluding the US, where it can hold the 
leadership position (19 out of 23 cases of groups excluding the US); and (iii) Japan opposes 
regional groups excluding Japan, where countries like Indonesia lead (Japan tried to join all of 4 
cases). 
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Theorizing Regional Group Formation  
 
Anatomy of Regional Institutions from a Membership Perspective 
 
 
Introduction  
 
 
寧 為 雞 口，無 為 牛 後 
 
It is better to be the head of a small group than to hold a 
less powerful position in a large group.  
 
(戰國策卷二十六 Zhan Guo Ce, Vol. 26) 
 
 
By the 4th Century BC, internal warring had decreased the number of major states in China 
to seven. Accommodating the increasing pressure related to the rise of Qin became the 
principal concern of statesmen in the other six states. Under such a situation, one strategist, 
Su Qin, persuaded the King of Han to form an association of the six countries (he zong: 
vertical association1). The telling phrase he used was, however, somewhat different from 
“balance of power,” which nowadays many international relations theorists still emphasize. 
He borrowed the ancient Chinese proverb above, suggesting the significance of “relative 
position” in associations. 
 
The principal purpose of this paper is to offer an alternative explanation to institution-
building, drawing inspiration from the Chinese proverb above. The ancient Peloponnesian 
War between Athens and Sparta provides the foundation for the theory of balancing, and it 
is not surprising that a new theory has been created, based on the strategy introduced in Zhan 
Guo Ce. The proposed theory sheds light on membership and leadership, 2  which are 
intrinsically linked concepts. The key factor connecting the two concepts to give an insight 
into group formation3 is “exclusion,” because exclusion of rivals is necessary in order for a 
state to become a leader. The theory predicts that a potential leader will attempt to establish 
a group from which more powerful states are excluded, in order to become an actual leader. 
Our main claim is that the creation of a regional group is an effective way to exclude rivals 
and become an actual leader. 
 
It seems existing international relations theories lack efficacy in explaining the membership 
formulation of institutions, especially exclusion from membership. The proposed theory 
attempts to narrow this gap. For example, one of the most important empirical findings of 
this study, Japan’s attempt to establish regional institutions which exclude the US, cannot be 
fully explained by existing theories. Realists may be puzzled by such Japanese policies, 
because the US is Japan’s only ally.4 Neoliberal institutionalism also has difficulty fully 
explaining Japan’s exclusionary attitude because of strong economic interdependence 
                                               
1 Qin was located in Western China and the other six states were located in the East. Thus, the association with Qin was 
called “horizontal” association, whereas the association of the six states was called “vertical” association.  
2 The leadership position and leadership behavior are different. Young (1991) differentiates leadership behavior of 
individuals into three types: entrepreneurial leadership; intellectual leadership; and structural leadership.  3 The term “group formation” is used as a synonym of institution-building at the subsystem level because the membership 
aspect of institution is our analytical focus. 
4 Institutions for engagement also include states powerful enough to engage a dissatisfied rising state (Schweller, 1999).  
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between the two countries. Constructivists may argue that the Asian identity held by Japan 
explains its preferences; however, Japan has always had a strong desire to include Australia 
and New Zealand despite recognizing them as Western countries.  
 
Despite its Chinese origin, the theory proposed in this study is expected to explain regional 
institution-building around the world. In fact, exclusion is a key to understanding, for 
example, the Monroe Doctrine, the regionalism policy enacted by the US before the WWII. 
From the European perspective, Herbert Kraus, Professor of University of Leipzig, 
convincingly argues that the objective of the Monroe Doctrine was to exclude European 
influence from the hemisphere (Kraus, 1914, p. 110). Likewise, Alejandro Alvarez, a Chilean 
diplomat, expresses the view that the Monroe Doctrine has exclusionary elements (Alvarez, 
1911). Furthermore, Tyler Dennett, Princeton Professor of History, argues that the Monroe 
Doctrine is similar to Japan’s wartime Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere in the sense 
that both regionalism policies insisted upon an “exclusive” responsibility in their respective 
areas.  
 
The Japanese and the American doctrines have had two common characteristics: 
(1) both doctrines have been justified by the claim of self-defense; (2) until the 
inauguration of the good neighbor policy in the Western Hemisphere, both 
countries assumed an exclusive responsibility for the execution of the doctrine in 
their respective areas (italic added) (Dennett, 1941, p. 61).  
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section briefly reviews the literature, focusing 
on one critical question of institutions: the demand for and supply of institutions. Next, the 
paper develops the RGF theory, explaining a potential leader’s attempt to supply a regional 
group by excluding rival states. The discussion on methodology follows. The empirical part 
of this paper tests the explanatory power of the proposed theory, using 33 cases of regional 
group formation projects in Asia-Pacific since WWII. It examines whether concerned 
countries’ regionalism policies are predominantly determined by the factors of membership 
(which countries participate in the group) and leadership (which country leads the group), 
and whether institution-building has a clear pattern in terms of membership. The final section 
concludes with some remarks on the applicability of the proposed theory to regional 
institution-building outside Asia.  
 
Demand and Supply of Institutions  
 
It is certain that the existence of an institution is the final institutional equilibrium, as Snidal 
(1994, p. 455) suggests.5 Neither supply nor demand alone provides a complete explanation 
of final institutional equilibrium; each theory emphasizes only one of them. Theories 
examined here include realism, neoliberal institutionalism, hegemonic stability theory, and 
constructivism. We will also briefly discuss literature that focuses on membership issues.  
 
Realists argue that the existence of a common external threat can be a trigger for the 
formation of a coalition. A coalition is essential to the survival of weaker states. Oft-cited 
examples of balancing include ASEAN against Vietnam (Walt, 1988, p. 314). The theory of 
balancing is a demand-side approach to international institutions. When there is a common 
threat, a coalition is required to mitigate the threat. The demand for a coalition leads to its 
actual existence, due to the assumption of “self-help” (Waltz, 1979, p. 91). As otherwise 
                                               
5 Unlike economics, the demand for and supply of an institution is a metaphor rather than artificially separated contrasting 
concepts (Keohane, 1982, p. 143).  
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states cannot survive, what is required or demanded for survival is actually realized.  
 
Neoliberal institutionalists argue that egoistic states cooperate and create institutions, 
because such states can enjoy the benefits produced by institutionalization. They assert that 
states can concentrate on absolute gains, as long as the plausibility of war is low (Powell, 
1991). An emphasis is placed on cooperation among interdependent states to solve common 
problems. States face the question of whether the management of complex economic 
environmental and social interdependence should be institutionalized or left to ad hoc 
political bargaining (Hurrell, 1995, p. 63). As the title of Keohane’s article The Demand for 
International Regimes suggests, the theory developed by institutionalists is a demand-side 
approach to institutions (Keohane, 1982).6 Some institutionalists recognize the importance 
of supply-side, but their analyses still emphasize collective action problems among co-
suppliers of an institution, when there is a demand for it (Mattli 1999, pp. 54-56).  
 
Hegemonic stability theory is based on Kindleberger’s (1973) work on world economic 
depression during the interwar period, The World in Depression 1929-1939. His central 
proposition is: “for the world economy to be stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer, one 
stabilizer” (ibid., p. 305). Only the hegemonic state, with predominance of power and a long-
term view of interest, has the will and means to “supply” international collective goods; that 
is, economic order in general, and international organizations such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in particular. 
It is obvious that the hegemonic stability theory is a supply-side theory of institutions 
(Keohane, 1982, p. 142).  
 
Constructivists emphasize the significance of ideational factors such as identity and 
imagination. The determination of an imagined boundary (insiders) and the formation of 
“self” and “others” are critical for constructivists. On collective identity formation, Wendt 
(1994, p. 386) argues “it is the nature of identification that determines how the boundaries 
of the self are drawn.” As Acharya (1999, p. 74) admits, the constructivist approach to 
regionalism often draws on Anderson’s work on nationalism. Anderson (1991, p. 7) argues 
that “the nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing 
perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie 
other nations.” The existence of common “others” is essential for an “imagined community” 
to be established. A regional identity that is derived from a collective act of self-imagination 
among concerned parties leads to the creation of an imagined region. What constructivists 
attempt to explain is neither demand for nor supply of regionalism, but imagination of 
community.  
 
There are several interesting studies focusing on the supply-side of institutions, with some 
emphasis on membership. Downs et al. (1998) show that an agreement starting with a small 
number of liberalization-minded countries that later expands membership can achieve 
deeper integration than an inclusive agreement negotiated by a large number of countries 
from the outset. According to their theory, the incentive of exclusion should be strong when 
agreements to liberalize economy are negotiated, which is counter-factual to the empirical 
finding of this paper; the incentive of exclusion is stronger in non-economic fields. Mattli 
(1999) attempts to offer a comprehensive explanation of regional institutions, including both 
demand and supply perspectives. His game theory-based analytical framework is in line with 
                                               
6 Keohane (1984) argues the demand-side is essential to explain the existence of institutions, because institutions continue 
to exist even when the distribution of power changes (after the decline of a hegemony) – a change in the supply-side 
conditions. 
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institutionalism, and essentially discusses the conditions under which (i) institutions are 
successfully established (e.g. the existence of monitoring and an enforcement mechanism) 
and (ii) outsiders are allow to obtain membership (e.g. net-positive contributions to insiders) 
(ibid, pp. 54-56, 63). However, his study pays little attention to the incentive of exclusion of 
rivals from original membership, held by suppliers of institutions. Those suggest that a more 
straightforward supply-side theory is needed to explain exclusion.  
 
Theorizing Regional Group Formation  
 
The proposed theory approaches regional group formation from the supply-side. While 
neither demand nor supply alone explains the existence of institutions, a close analysis of 
the supply-side is justified, because the process of institution-building is usually initiated by 
a proposal from a state that is keen to supply (establish) the institution. Various institutional 
features are largely determined by suppliers. Because the proposed RGF theory offers an 
alternative explanation to regional institutions from the supply-side perspective, it synergizes 
with existing international relations theories which emphasize the demand-side of 
institutions, to explain the institutional equilibrium where the demand should match the 
supply. 
 
Limits of Regional Application of Hegemonic Stability Theory  
 
Hegemonic stability theory, which is a supply-side theory, gives us a good starting point for 
discussion, despite its weakness.7 The hegemon’s provisions to global institutions entail 
both costs and benefits (Lake, 1993, p. 467; Russett, 1985). The proponents of the theory 
emphasize the costs of supplying the institutions (hence, they regard institutions as collective 
goods). A leader, to create stability, must maintain an open market for other countries’ surplus 
goods, maintain steady capital outflow for productive investment in other countries, and also 
provide liquidity, to serve as a “lender of last resort” (Kindleberger, 1973, p. 292). Its 
opponents regard hegemonic institutions as private goods, emphasizing the benefits gained 
by being a supplier of order. A hegemon can design and use institutions to pursue its own 
agenda.8 Moreover, the hegemon may also require contribution from the other participants, 
because the hegemonic power constitutes a quasi-world government (Snidal, 1985, p. 587).  
 
A hegemon can also enjoy prestige by playing the role of stabilizer and/or supplying and 
leading institutions (Kindleberger 1981, p. 248), though this point is easily forgotten. While 
sovereignty principle holds that states are formally equal, there are informal rankings of 
states in terms of prestige (Wood, 2013). What should be noted is that, as Jervis (1993, p. 
58) argues citing the example of the Olympics where only one country can win the most 
medals, competition for primacy is required for international status and prestige. The prestige 
of the organizational leadership position is an important source of influence on other 
members (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986, p. 756). The hegemon naturally receives the lion’s 
share of prestige when it supplies global institutions, because of its primacy in the global 
arena.  
 
Because hegemonic stability theory is a systemic theory used to explain global institutions 
                                               
7 Scholars consider that what is essential to define hegemony is control over outcomes and that concentration of material 
capacity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the existence of international institutions (Russett 1985; Snidal, 
1985, p. 582).  
8 Conybear (1987) suggests that the international trade system is used by the hegemon as a tool of predatory trade policy. 
It is also argued that the IMF was used by the US government to secure both its political influence and commercial interests 
(Wade and Veneroso, 1998). 
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supplied by hegemons, its simple application at the regional level is impossible. The problem 
of free-riding becomes critical in the case of regionalism, because parties that free-ride on 
regional institutions are “outsiders” (Ravenhill, 2001, p. 11). This problem is often 
emphasized in the case of trade, because non-members’ trade could be favorably affected by 
regional free trade projects. There may be a free-riding problem in the case of financial 
regionalism as well. When a regional monetary fund, not the IMF, prevents a financial crisis, 
it is also beneficial for non-members that did not contribute to the fund.  
 
There are also benefits specific to regional leaders. First, the leader in a regional group 
increases its influence on smaller members at the expense of excluded rival “outsiders.” 
When a regional group is created and the interactions among the members increase, the 
dependence of smaller states on larger states becomes greater in a relative term. As Jacob 
Viner argues in The Custom Union Issue, Prussia established Zollverein with weaker German 
states and kept Austria out of the group in order to increase its influence in the region, and 
to minimize that of Austria (Viner, 1950, pp. 98-99). Second, regional institution-building 
also leads to prestige. As Morgenthau (1962) argues, setting up a mechanism to provide 
benefits which support junior partners is a typical way of conducting a “policy of prestige,” 
and creating a regional mechanism is not an exception. A leader in a group gains prestige 
vis-à-vis junior partners only when its primacy is secured at the expense of excluded parties, 
including any hegemon. 
 
 
Table 1: Cost and Benefit of Hegemon and Regional Leader  
 
 Cost Benefit 
Hegemon  Providing financial resources to other members  
 Open domestic markets for imports from other 
members  
 Designing institutions, including contribution 
mechanism from other members 
 Prestige of supplying institution 
 Increasing influence on other members 
Regional 
leader 
 Being free-ridden on financial resources by non-
member free-riders 
 Being free-ridden on opening market by non-
member free-riders 
 Gaining prestige at the expense of excluded 
potential leaders  
 Increasing influence on other members at the 
expense of non-members 
Note: Regional leader’s cost and benefit are in addition to those of the hegemon.  
 
 
Regional Group Formation Theory  
 
In The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Karl Popper argues that “simplicity [of statements] is 
so highly desirable … because [simple statements] tell us more; because their empirical 
content is greater; because they are better testable (Popper, 1959).” It is wise to start with 
simple assumptions and deduce a simple hypothesis that can be easily tested, which may be 
later modified into more complex hypotheses. We will have two simple assumptions from 
which a hypothesis can be drawn.  
 
Assumption 1: A geographical area covered by a regional group is not determined a 
priori.  
 
Because a region is not a given, determining membership of a regional group may become 
a problem. Harris (2000, p. 498) clearly states that “the definition of the region … is what 
the states of the region make of it.”  
 
Assumption 2: Holding the leadership position of a regional group is beneficial overall. 
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It is assumed that the benefits of being leader are larger than the costs, which is certainly a 
strong assumption. As discussed, when countries value prestige, being the leader becomes 
significantly beneficial. While existing studies that consider prestige and status, often 
emphasizing the “ranking” of states, argue that having a seat at a “great power club” is 
critical in gaining status and prestige (Buzan, 2004; Paul and Shankar, 2014), the assumption 
that having the Chairperson’s seat, even at a small club, also contributes to status and prestige, 
seems justifiable.    
 
The proposed theory includes two key states, which are defined as follows.  
 
Superior Potential Regional Leader (SPRL): A state that will be an actual regional 
leader, unless it is excluded by IPRL.  
 
Inferior Potential Regional Leader (IPRL): A state that can be an actual regional 
leader, only when SPRL is excluded.  
 
SPRL and IPRL are inseparable from each other. There are always Number 1 and Number 2 
within a limited geographical space; the former is SPRL and the latter is IPRL. SPRL is 
accompanied by IPRL, which could be Number 1, if a regional group excluding SPRL is 
created. In Figure 1, Country A is IPRL vis-à-vis Country B, which is SPRL. At the same 
time, Country B is IPRL vis-à-vis Country C, which is SPRL.  
 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of Theory  
 
Source: Author’s illustration  
 
 
The paired relationship between SPRL and IPRL has both upper and lower ends. Because 
the hegemon is the most powerful country, there is no need for it to exclude others to be an 
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actual leader. It is also difficult for states that are not geographically near other, smaller states, 
to become leaders, even in a very small group (for example, Mongolia between China and 
Russia; Laos between Thailand and Vietnam; and Korea between China and Japan). In 
Figure 1, Country D, surrounded by Countries B and C, is under just such a geographical 
condition.    
 
From the two assumptions above, a theory below is deduced. The logic of inference is 
straightforward. If the leading position in a regional group is beneficial, which countries are 
not welcome by the state that is attempting to create it? Of course, more powerful states that 
deprive it of the leading position are not welcome.  
 
Regional Group Formation Theory: IPRL establishes a regional group in which it can 
hold the leading position, by excluding SPRL(s). More specifically, in Figure 1, State B 
attempts to create a regional group whose boundary is Y.9  
 
Methodology  
 
Empirical Strategy  
 
Three empirical strategies are employed to examine the explanatory power of the proposed 
theory. First, this study examines the interactions of the regionalism policies of various 
countries. How other countries react when an unfavorable regional project is proposed 
deserves close examination. Not only successful but also unsuccessful attempts are analyzed 
in this study, because the latter tells us why a certain country wanted to establish (supply) it 
and why others did not welcome (demand) it. The fact that regionalism projects sometimes 
fail is a neglected but important fact (Hettne, 2005, p. 556). 
 
Second, because a theory is required to explain the behavioral patterns of states, rather than 
a one-off change (Waltz, 1978, p. 69), we will analyze a large number of projects to reveal 
the pattern of policy regarding regionalism. We will examine projects not only individually, 
but also collectively (as a “sequence” of projects), to reveal patterns of regionalism policies. 
If a country that is deprived of the leading position by the accession of a more powerful rival 
country abandons the expanded institution and establishes a new group excluding the rival, 
and such a sequence continues, the country’s membership preference can be revealed.  
 
Third, we will classify regionalism into three issue areas: diplomatic, finance, and trade. As 
Mansfield and Milner (1999, p. 589) argue, many of the existing studies on regionalism are 
centered on trade. Classification is useful because the “cost” of being leader significantly 
varies across issue areas. In the case of trade, importing products from junior partners is 
costly, though the actual magnitude depends on institutional design – trade regionalism 
varies from treaty-based free trade arrangements to regional forum on trade issues. In the 
case of finance, provision of funds is costly. Again, the actual cost varies, from regional 
development banks to a regional forum on financial issues. In the case of (pure) diplomatic 
regionalism (e.g., a regional summit), economic costs seem unsubstantial. However, one 
should note that clear-cut demarcation is difficult, especially for diplomatic frameworks, 
because they may deal with economic-related matters.  
 
                                               
9 One weakness of the proposed theory is that an exact area covered by the regional group proposed by IPRL is unclear. 
In Figure 1, it is uncertain which area, Y or Y’ or Y’’ is covered by a framework sponsored by State B. What is clear is that 
State B will not propose boundary Z (see Conclusion for the further sophistication of the theory). 
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Case Selection  
 
Asia-Pacific is an interesting area in which to study group formation because it is a vast and 
heterogeneous area with blurred boundaries. Its parts may contend themselves to be a region 
rather than a sub-region. It is not surprising if various countries insist upon totally different 
membership configurations.  
 
The next question is why we put special, though not exclusive, focus on Japan. There are 
three reasons, parallel to the empirical strategies explained above. First, geographically, 
Japan is sandwiched between the US and Indonesia. This implies that Japan’s regionalism 
policies have significant interactions with their regionalism policies. To be more specific, 
Japan’s regionalism projects can be challenged by “larger” regionalism projects led by the 
US and “smaller” regionalism projects led by Indonesia. Second, Japan has been a very 
active player in terms of regionalism. While Kent Calder’s reactive state hypothesis is valid 
in explaining Japan’s foreign policy in general (1988), it is also interesting to note that 
Japanese regionalism projects such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) are often 
mentioned by scholars that emphasize proactive aspect of Japan’s external policies 
(Yasutomo, 1983). By examining an enormous number of regionalism projects, we can 
generalize behavior patterns of Japan, and others. Third, Japan proposed regional institutions 
in all of the three issue areas, providing the opportunity to compare regionalism policies in 
various issue areas. Carrier officials do not move from one ministry to another (except for 
short term fixed transfers for limited positions) and each ministry maintains its distinctive 
view on policies, including those on regionalism, sometimes causing ministerial rivalry.  
 
Observable Implications  
 
What can be directly compared using empirical data is not a theory per se, but rather are 
observable implications from the theory (King et al., 1994, pp. 28-29). There are three 
observable implications derived from the theory, with regard to Japan’s regionalism policy.  
 
Observable Implication 1: Japan proposes (supports) a regional group that excludes 
the US.  
 
Observable Implication 2: When a regional group including the US is proposed, Japan 
does not support that group. When the US joins a regional group established by Japan, 
Japan abandons the group, and attempts to create a new group that excludes the US. 
 
Observable Implication 3: When a small regional group that excludes Japan is 
established (proposed), by Indonesia for example, Japan attempts to participate in it or 
makes a counter-proposal to take part in or establish a regional group in which it is 
included.  
 
Data Source 
 
Data used in this study principally relies on written information sources, both first- and 
second-hand documents.10 National archives of three countries are used: the Diplomatic 
Record Office of Japan, the National Archives of Australia, and the National Archives of the 
                                               
10 Interviews were not conducted to secure “equal” treatment among cases. It is impossible to conduct interviews with 
policymakers involved the regionalism projects in the early post-war era.  
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United Kingdom.11 Official governmental documents such as the Diplomatic Blue Book 
and the Trade White Paper, and various governmental information available to the public 
are used to examine governmental policies. Memoirs and books by policymakers are 
important first-hand information; those written by Japanese, American and Australian 
officials are used. Officials’ contributions to policy-related journals published by 
government-affiliated agencies also provide critical explanations behind the policymaking. 
Newspapers in both Japanese (Nikkei Shimbun, Yomiuri Shimbun, Asahi Shimbun Sankei 
Shimbun, and Mainichi Shimbun) and English (Financial Times, New York Times and 
Australian Financial Review, and Korean Economic Review etc.) are used.  
 
Regional Group Formation in Asia: 1950s – 2010s    
 
This section examines the explanatory power of the proposed theory by analyzing 33 RGF 
projects including diplomatic (12 cases), financial (10 cases), and trade (11 cases) projects. 
Because such an empirical investigation is enormous in scope, we first present the result to 
establish a rough idea regarding the theory’s validity. Table 2 summarizes the findings in 
line with the observable implications discussed above.  
 
 
Table 2: Actual Interactions of Regionalism Policies 
 
 Southeast Asia Asia Asia-Pacific 
Diplomacy  ASA – Japan tried to join 
 MAPHILINDO – Japan 
made a counter proposal 
 ASEAN – Japan tried to 
join 
 ASEAN Summit – Japan 
made a counter proposal 
and then tried to join 
 West Pacific Summit – Japan 
proposed 
 MCEDSEA – Japan proposed 
 ASPAC – Japan supported  
 Akiyama proposal – Japan 
(unofficially) proposed 
 Asian Summit – Japan proposed  
 Japan-ASEAN Summit – Japan 
proposed  
 EAS – Japan tried to include the US  
 APEC Summit – Japan was 
reluctant  
Finance   ADF – Japan proposed 
 ADB – Japan supported 
 APBC – Japan proposed 
 EMEAP – Japan proposed 
 Four Markets Group – Japan 
proposed 
 AMF- Japan proposed 
 ASEAN+3 FMM – Japan supported 
 CMI – Japan proposed 
 AIIB – Japan opposed 
 Six Markets Group – Japan 
was reluctant  
Trade   IRTPT – MOFA proposed (other 
ministries cautious) 
 OAEC – MOFA supported (MAFF 
rejected) 
 Japan-SEA PTA – MOFA proposed 
(MAFF rejected)  
 Asian Lóme (STABEX) – MOFA 
was keen, but MOF was reluctant.  
 Asian Lóme (PTA) – All ministries 
rejected 
 EAEC – MOFA supported (MITI 
opposed)  
 EAFTA – Japan did not support and 
counter-proposed CEPEA 
 PAFTA – MOFA did not 
support 
 Pacific Basin Plan – PM 
Ohira proposed but MOFA 
did not support 
 APEC – MOFA was 
reluctant to include the US; 
MITI wanted to include 
 TPP – Japan decided to 
participate after the US 
Note: shaded institutions are deviant cases.  
 
 
                                               
11 Regarding US diplomatic records, several studies based on US archive research are used. 
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 Diplomatic regionalism: (i) Among seven diplomatic groups excluding the US, Japan 
proposed or supported six cases. The only diplomatic group without the US to which 
Japan objected was the East Asia Summit (EAS). (ii) There was one diplomatic group 
including the US, and Japan did not support it. (iii) There were four diplomatic groups 
excluding Japan led by Indonesia or the Philippines, and Japan attempted to join them, or 
counter-proposed the creation of alternative institutions in which it was included. 
Japanese and Indonesian (sometimes the Philippines) regionalism projects often 
compete.12 (iv) With regard to sequences, when an Asian diplomatic group faded out, 
Japan tried to establish a new one. The Asian Summit proposal after the suspension of 
Ministerial Conference for Economic Development in Southeast Asia (MCEDSEA), and 
the Akiyama proposal after the suspension of the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) are 
illustrative examples.  
 
 Financial Regionalism: (i) There were nine financial regionalism projects excluding the 
US, and Japan proposed or supported eight of them. Among them, two of the projects, the 
Asian Development Fund (AFD) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), were 
proposed or supported by Japan soon after WWII, when Japan’s economic power was 
low. Both included the US as an external financial contributor, but excluded it from 
regional membership, limiting its institutional voice. The only deviant case is that of the 
Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) proposed by China; both Japan and the US 
have thus far declined to join. (ii) One financial regionalism project that included the US 
originally started as an Asia-only group; the US later joined (Six Markets Group). Japan 
abandoned this group soon after its expansion. (iii) With regard to sequences, when an 
Asian financial grouping expanded its membership to include the US, Japan tries to 
establish a new group excluding the US. The Japanese proposal of the Asian Monetary 
Fund (AMF) soon after the evolution of the Four Markets Group to the Six Markets Group, 
and Japan’s support for the ASEAN+3 finance process after the conversion of the AMF 
proposal to Manila Framework Group (MFG), are illustrative examples.  
 
 Trade Regionalism: Trade regionalism projects involve many ministries that have 
different attitudes towards trade regionalism, which applies not only to Japan but also to 
the US.13 While the overall policy of Japan tends to be unclear because of differences 
across ministries, the proposed theory at least clarifies the policy preference of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA); that is, a strong preference for Asia-only trade 
groupings. (i) MOFA supported four of the six projects that excluded the US, while other 
ministries maintained a more cautious attitude because of their concern of increased 
import from Asian neighbors. Hence, there are two deviant cases: the Japan-ASEAN 
Preferential Trade Agreement to which both MOFA and other ministries objected; and the 
East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA), excluding the US, and opposed by all Japanese 
ministries. (ii) Among four trade regionalism projects including the US, MOFA opposed 
three cases. The only deviant case is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which Japan 
joined after the US.  
 
The subsections below chronologically review RGF in Asia-Pacific after WWII, in the fields 
of diplomacy, finance, and trade, in turn.  
 
                                               
12 Those include: (i) MAPHILINDO versus West Pacific Summit; (ii) Ministerial Conference for Economic Development 
in Southeast Asia (MCEDSEA) versus Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); and (iii) Asian Summit versus 
ASEAN Summit. 
13 See the US reactions to the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) discussed below.  
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Diplomatic Regionalism  
 
Association for Southeast Asia (ASA). ASA was established in July 1961 with the 
membership of Malaya, the Philippines, and Thailand. ASA was an exclusionary 
organization, at least from a Japanese perspective. The Philippines in particular precluded 
Japan from joining because it feared that Japan would assume the leadership (Kesavan, 1972, 
p. 155). In fact, in late 1961, Ōkita Saburō, a high-ranking official who later became foreign 
minister, asked the Philippines Foreign Minister, Felixberto Serrano, whether Japan’s future 
participation in ASA was possible. Serrano’s answer was negative. Ōkita then started to think 
that not only cooperation in Southeast Asia, but also a cooperation covering a wider region 
necessary (Ōkita, 1966, p. 16).  
 
West Pacific Summit. Prime Minister Ikeda had the idea to organize the West Pacific 
Summit among five Pacific states (Japan, Indonesia, Philippines, Australia and New 
Zealand) in Tokyo in 1964 to discuss two issues. First, a peaceful solution of the Indonesia-
Malaysia dispute was expected as an immediate result of the summit. Second, the 
establishment of the West Pacific Organization, a Pacific version of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), was expected, though it was believed to 
be a long-term project.14 In order to win support from the partner countries, the West Pacific 
tour was organized in September 1963. Ikeda visited the US Ambassador to Japan, Edwin O. 
Reischauer, just two days before his departure, and Reischauer supported Ikeda’s idea. 
However, the US State Department directed Reischauer against support of the West Pacific 
Summit. The US preferred to support the MAPHILINDO Summit sponsored by the 
Philippines, rather than supporting the Japanese summit proposal (Miyagi, 2004, pp. 63-
6415). 
 
MAPHILINDO. MAPHILINDO was a regional framework among Malaysia, Indonesia 
and the Philippines to mitigate the neighbor states’ strong confrontational attitude to the 
forthcoming launch of the Federation of Malaysia, which had been announced in November 
1961. The foreign ministers’ meeting among the three countries was held in June 1963, and 
the Manila Accord was adopted, stipulating that the first summit would be held by the end 
of July (Haas, 1974, pp. 1261-63). Only two months after the Manila Accord, Ikeda proposed 
the West Pacific Summit. The two summits were in competition, because their purposes 
overlapped. The Philippines’ government leaked Ikeda’s idea for the West Pacific Summit 
soon after the Ikeda-Macapagal meeting to nullify the idea,16 despite Japan’s request to keep 
it secret, frustrating Ikeda.17  
 
Ministerial Conference for Economic Development in Southeast Asia (MCEDSEA). At 
the annual Japan-US ministerial meeting held in July 1965 in Washington, the US requested 
Japanese assistance to help materialize President Johnson’s plan regarding Southeast Asian 
development. Japan, however, made a counter-proposal introducing MCEDSEA, insisting 
that the American plan to support only pro-US states in Southeast Asia was insufficient to 
promote the region’s economic development. The US response to the MCEDSEA plan was 
unfavorable (Yagisawa, 1967, p. 13). The Washington Post opined that MCEDSEA 
illustrated Japan’s ambitions to play a large political and economic role in Asia by 
                                               
14 Yomiuri Shimbun, September 16, 1963.  
15 His study is based on the US State Department archives.  
16 Asahi Shimbun, September 26, 1963.  
17 Asahi Shimbun, October 5, 1963.  
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reproducing the Great East Asian Co-prosperity Area.18 However, the US government did 
not reject the proposal entirely, partly because US officials underestimated the political 
significance of MCEDSEA. In fact, Dean Rusk, then Secretary of State, regarded 
MCEDSEA as a Japan-led agricultural project (Rusk, 1987).  
 
The first MCEDSEA meeting was held in April 1966 in Tokyo, with the participation of 
Japan, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia 
and Cambodia both present to observe. Japan hoped to establish a secretariat in the first 
meeting to legitimize MCEDSEA as a full-fledged regional institution, but the other 
members opposed this.19 There was a concern among Asian countries that the secretariat 
would be institutionalized in Tokyo, which may have led to Japanese leadership in Asian 
cooperation, and hence the other members insisted on the venue being elsewhere.20  
 
From the Japanese perspective, MCEDSEA provided a diplomatic framework. MOFA had 
proposed it, and the head of the Japanese delegation was always the Foreign Minister. 
However, for Southeast Asian countries, MCEDSEA had the aspects of an economic 
developmental framework. In fact, the heads of the representatives to the conference of 
Southeast Asian countries were often Economic Development Ministers. Southeast Asian 
countries regarded MCEDSEA as a tool to increase Japanese Official Development 
Assistance (ODA). Because of dissatisfaction on the Southeast Asian-side, no more 
MCEDSEA meetings were held after 1975.  
 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN was launched in August 1967. 
Indonesia was particularly enthusiastic about its creation, because joining a new organization 
would be much better for Indonesia than simply joining the existing ASA (Morrison and 
Suhrke, 1978, pp. 225-26). Japan was interested in membership of ASEAN, though the 
Japanese government did not officially apply for it. In August 1967, one month after 
ASEAN’s establishment, Kai Fumihiko, the Japanese Ambassador to Malaysia, stated at a 
press conference that Japan expected membership of ASEAN.21 In response, Indonesian 
Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, asserted that Japan’s accession to ASEAN was impossible 
because of its geographical location.22  
 
The Japan-led MCEDSEA and Indonesia-led ASEAN competed. Officials in Tokyo turned 
to MCEDSEA after ASEAN’s rejection of Japanese membership (Sudo, 1988, p. 511). As 
the former Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs admits, the Japanese government considered 
that MCEDSEA, which included Japan, was more effective than ASEAN as a platform for 
regional cooperation (Kikuchi, 2004, p. 89). During his state visit to Southeast Asia in 
September 1967, Prime Minister Satō refused to discuss Japanese assistance through 
ASEAN, because he did not want to support capacity development of ASEAN in competition 
with MCEDSEA (Sudo, 1988, p. 511). Indonesia also perceived the two as competing. In 
the eighth MCEDSEA meeting held in Tokyo, the head of the Indonesian delegation asserted: 
“We consider that ASEAN is the most appropriate regional framework. We understand that 
other groupings should complement it.”23  
 
Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC). ASPAC was established in June 1966. The original 
                                               
18 Cited in Asahi Shimbun, April 7, 1966. 
19 Asahi Shimbun, October 13, 1965.  
20 Asahi Shimbun, October 14, 1973.  
21 Asahi Shimbun, August 21, 1967. Also see Sudo (1988, 510).  
22 Asahi Shimbun, August 31, 1967.  
23 Asahi Shimbun, October 14, 1973.  
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members of ASPAC were South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, 
South Vietnam, Australia, New Zealand, and Laos (observer). South Korea launched ASPAC 
as a military framework. Japan initially maintained its distance from the security-oriented 
ASPAC, and did not promptly agree to send delegates to the first meeting. 24 The third 
meeting, hosted by Australia, was a watershed in terms of the transformation of ASPAC, 
because it was agreed that the security tone of the organization should be weakened. 
 
The fourth ASPAC meeting was hosted by Japan in 1969, in Tokyo. Japan was attracted to 
ASPAC because it did not include the US. In the opening ceremony, Prime Minister Satō 
stated that ASPAC’s value lie in the fact that it includes only East Asia, Southeast Asia, and 
the South Pacific, and proposed to call the region covered by ASPAC “Pacific Asia.” Other 
countries also regarded non-inclusion of the US and Japanese centrality as the distinctive 
feature of ASPAC. For example, the Australian Minister for External Affairs, Paul Hasluck, 
states in his report about the second ASPAC meeting that ASPAC is an Asian organization 
which includes Australia but not the US, and concludes that Australia’s association with 
Japan in ASPAC enables Australia to exert an influence on Japan’s regionalism policies 
(Australian Minister for External Affairs, 1967).   
 
The Akiyama proposal. Following US President Nixon’s visit to Beijing in 1972, ASPAC 
lost its momentum. Japan was interested in the establishment of an ASPAC-like new 
institution when the abolishment of ASPAC became likely. The document produced at the 
Australian Embassy in Tokyo in 1972 reported Akiyama, the head of the Asian Regional 
Policy Division of MOFA, as remarking that if ASPAC were to fade away, a new regional 
organization would replace it, and inclusion of the ASEAN countries New Zealand, Australia, 
Japan, and Korea, would be necessary (Australian Embassy in Tokyo, 1972). 
 
Asian Summit. The first G6 Summit was held in November 1975, in Rambouillet, France. 
Japanese Prime Minister Miki Takeo considered that Japan should participate in the Summit 
as an Asian representative, and collected “the voice of Asia” by sending an envoy to ASEAN 
countries both before and after the Summit.25 After the Summit, he felt that hosting an 
“Asian version of [the] Summit” would be beneficial. However, such a plan proved difficult 
to enact, because the first ASEAN Summit was planned by its members.  
 
ASEAN Summit. Miki, then, changed Japan’s strategy, and attempted to participate in the 
ASEAN Summit.26 The trilateral foreign ministers’ meeting of the Philippines, Singapore, 
and Thailand, on January 16 reached a decision to invite Miki.27 The Indonesian Foreign 
Minister, Adam Malik, however, insisted on January 26 that the ASEAN Summit was the 
summit for ASEAN members and that a non-member’s leader could not participate in it.28 
At the ASEAN Ministers’ Meeting on February 10, 1976, members discussed the question 
of Japanese participation; Indonesia rejected the idea, while others were in favor of it.29 
Funabashi (1995, p. 344) explains that ASEAN emphasized maintaining a “distance” 
between Japan and ASEAN, by refusing to invite Miki to the ASEAN Summit.  
 
What is to be noted is that the timing envisaged by Miki for the idea of an Asian Summit and 
Japanese participation in the ASEAN Summit coincided with the period when MCEDSEA’s 
                                               
24 Asahi Shimbun, February 23, 1966.  
25 Nikkei Shimbun, November 28, 1975.  
26 Nikkei Shimbun, January 25, 1976.  
27 Asahi Shimbun, January 22, 1976.  
28 Reuter, January 26, 1976, cited in Nikkei Shimbun, January 27, 1976.  
29 Asahi Shimbun, February 10, 1976.  
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abolition became likely. Gordon (1977-78, p. 580) observes that when Japan gave up 
sustaining MCEDSEA in 1976, it hoped instead to be invited to participate in the ASEAN 
Summit. The abolition of MCEDSEA forced Japan to create a new regional framework in 
which it could be involved.  
 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit. APEC was established as a trade 
regionalism project in 1989 (see section on trade for details). It was Australian Prime 
Minister Paul Keating who first proposed the APEC Summit. He consulted with US 
President George H. W. Bush about the idea in early 1992. While Bush manifested interest 
in Keating’s proposal, he preferred to delay involvement until there was a wide consensus. 
Partly because Bush had not been enthusiastic about the proposal, it was easy for the new 
administration, which started in January 1993, to initiate it (Funabashi, 1995, p. 82). 
President Bill Clinton officially proposed to host the first APEC Summit in his July 1993 
speech in San Francisco made prior to his Asian tour. The Summit was actually held in 
November of the same year in Seattle.  
 
Japan was reluctant to support the upgrade of APEC to the level of a summit. In April 1992, 
Keating sent out a letter, in which the idea of an APEC summit was explained to the leaders 
of APEC members. While he received positive replies from the others, Japan was said to 
have been reticent about the proposal (ibid., p. 83). Moreover, although Keating urged 
Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi to support the APEC Summit when he visited 
Japan in May 1993, Japan did not finally approve it until July 1993, when the establishment 
of the APEC Summit became inevitable (ibid., p. 193). A senior US official also recalled that 
Japan was reluctant to accept the APEC Summit due to its initiation by the US (ibid., p. 287).  
 
East Asia Summit (EAS). The first ASEAN+3 Summit was held in December, 1997.30 
China attempted to convert the ASEAN+3 Summit to EAS, because the “plus three countries 
(China, Japan and Korea)” are treated as guests in the former. At the China-ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers’ Meeting in Qingdao in June 2004, China expressed its desire to host EAS. At the 
ASEAN+3 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in July 2004, China officially proposed EAS, 
including only ASEAN+3 countries, but Japan submitted an issue paper on membership, 
expressing its disagreement with the membership formulation (MOFA, 2004). At the 
ASEAN+3 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in May 2005 in Kyoto, inclusion of India, Australia 
and New Zealand was agreed upon, reflecting Japan’s preference for membership. Because 
of opposition from others including China, Japanese Foreign Minister, Machimura Nobutaka, 
was unsuccessful in his proposal to invite the US to attend as an observer.31,32  
 
Financial Regionalism  
 
Asian Development Fund (ADF). Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke shared his idea of 
establishing ADF with US President Dwight D. Eisenhower in June 1957 in Washington. 
Committee chaired by Kenneth Young examined Kish’s proposal and concluded in 
September that the US should not support ADF. This is interesting because the idea of 
establishing a framework for Asian economic development originally came from the US 
government (Kaufman, 1982, p. 161). Huang (1975, p. 18) explains that the US rejected 
                                               
30 Japan was keen to host the Japan-ASEAN Summit. But ASEAN sought to include China in the summit, in order to not 
provoke it (Asahi Shimbun, January 15, 1997).  
31 Sankei Shimbun, May 7, 2005. Interestingly, the US did not support Machimura’s idea because it did not want to assume 
the “back-seat” of an observer (Asahi Shimbun, May 15, 2005).  
32 The US joined EAC in 2010 as an observer and as a full member after 2011.  
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Kishi’s proposal because it relied heavily upon American financing while retaining 
essentially Japanese arrangements, nor did it give the US much of a direct management voice. 
The Japanese government attempted to establish “the ADF without the US,” when American 
contribution appeared unlikely in September 1957,33 supporting the view that the ADF was 
a Japan-sponsored project. The size of the fund was scaled down to one-fifth of the original 
ADF proposal. The US was not supportive even of this.34 Japan eventually abandoned this 
plan, because the financial burden was too large.  
 
Asian Development Bank (ADB). In October 1962, a study group to explore the possibility 
of establishing a regional development bank was formed by Ministry of Finance (MOF). 
After one year of monthly studies, the group prepared a proposal paper which explained 
what were to be several important features of the bank: (i) equal contributions would be 
made as between Japan and the US; (ii) it would have a Japanese President; and (iii) it would 
be headquartered in Tokyo. Watanabe, the study group chair, consulted US government 
officials about the plan in Washington in September 1963. The US response was, however, 
unenthusiastic (Huang, 1975, p. 23).  
 
Meanwhile, in January 1963 at the fifth United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and 
the Far East (ECAFE) Intra-Regional Trade Promotion Talk (IRTPT, see below), a Thai 
delegate mentioned the idea of creating a regional financial institution. At ECAFE’s first 
ministerial meeting held by regional members in December 1963 in Manila, ministers agreed 
to conduct a study on establishing a regional bank. Taking this opportunity, Japan attempted 
to revitalize its previous idea. Experts from eight regional members of ECAFE first held a 
meeting in October 1964, with Watanabe represented Japan. Experts agreed to carefully 
design the ADB to be led by regional countries (Watanabe, 1973, p. 16). The consultative 
committee among nine Asian countries35 in Bangkok in June 1965 agreed to include the US 
as a non-regional member (Huang, 1975, p. 72). The preparatory meeting was held in 
Bangkok in October 1965; non-regional ECAFE members were also invited, unlike for past 
meetings. Because almost all details of the bank had already been scrutinized, many non-
Asian countries were unhappy, and some, such as France, did not even send delegates (ibid., 
p. 85). 
 
However, the US pledged a contribution to the ADB at the preparatory meeting. This is 
interesting because many US senior officials recall that the US government did not intend to 
join the ADB, even in March 1965 (Rostow, 1986, p. 8; Black, 1969, p. 97). President 
Johnson’s speech in Baltimore on April 7 1965, which mentioned US aid to Southeast Asia, 
was the turning point of its ADB policy. The essential reason was its involvement in the war 
in Vietnam (White, 1970, p. 44). In fact, the speech was made just a few weeks after the US 
began bombing North Vietnam. The US expected that its support of the ADB could mitigate 
anti-US sentiment in Asia. It also attempted to reduce Japanese influence in the ADB. While 
the US did not have a right to vote for the location of the bank, it was supportive of Manila, 
which was eventually realized (Kashiwagi, 1998, p. 71). The US concern was that Japan 
would become too influential in the ADB if it obtained both the presidential position and the 
headquarter site (Wesley, 2003, p. 27).36 
 
Asia Pacific Bankers’ Club (APBC). The APBC is an Asian version of the International 
                                               
33 Mainichi Shimbun, September 6, 1957.  
34 Mainichi Shimbun, September 24, 1957, evening edition.  
35 Japan, Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Iran.  
36 Another important reason is Japan’s low posture (Huang, 1975, p. 39; Yasutomo, 1983, p. 39). 
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Monetary Conference (IMC) dominated by Western bankers (Fujioka, 1981). The first 
APBC gathering was held in Tokyo in April 1981. Although the members of APBC were 
private bankers, it is not a purely private body, because Fujioka Masao, a former Director 
General of MOF, was the founding father.37 Its membership was limited to bankers from 
Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, 
Australia, and New Zealand.38 There was a consensus among Japanese policymakers that 
the non-inclusion of American banks is APBC’s distinctive feature (Fujioka, 1981, p. 246). 
While Fujioka insists that APBC is not exclusive, he rejected all membership requests from 
non-“Asia Pacific” bankers, wavering only when upon request from a Hawaiian bank. He 
visited Hawaii in August 1980, and stated that he would favor establishment of a new club 
only for the Western inhabitants of the Pacific at this time (ibid, p. 246). 
 
Executives’ Meeting of East Asia and Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP). The Bank of 
Japan (BOJ) established EMEAP in 1991, as deputy-level meetings. The original members 
were: Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, 
Australia and New Zealand. China and Hong Kong joined in 1992 and 1993, respectively. 
The speech made by the Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia, Bernie Fraser, in 
September 1995, calling for an Asian version of the Bank for International Settlement (BIS), 
was the catalyst which triggered the institutionalization of EMEAP (Fraser, 1995, p. 24). In 
July 1996 in Tokyo, the first Governors’ meeting was held and three working/study groups 
parallel to BIS organizations were established thereafter (Lee, 2002, p. 327).  
 
After the upgrade, the US Federal Reserve Board (FRB) unsuccessfully attempted to use 
Treasury Bill repossession arrangements among EMEAP members to try to negotiate its 
membership (Yokoi-Arai, 2002, p. 218). It is curious that the US suddenly requested 
membership in the mid-1990s. The most plausible reason for its doing so is that EMEAP 
was confidential (EMEAP, 2003), and the US did not recognize its existence.39 Werner 
(2003) points out that BOJ was successful in creating an “exclusive” club, because it is little 
known to the public and has maintained a low profile (also see Hook et al., 2002). The US 
might have suddenly become aware of EMEAP’s existence after the Fraser proposal (Oritani, 
1997), and decided to request membership: the second-best choice, because abolishing 
EMEAP was not a realistic option.  
 
Four Markets Group. Meanwhile, the Four Markets Group first met in 1992 under the 
initiative of MOF. The then-Vice Finance Minister, Chino Tadao, believed that Asia should 
have its own voice in the international financial community, rather than merely following 
the US.40 The members of the group included Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Australia. 
The purpose of the group was to strengthen the relationship among regional financial 
authorities and to exchange market information, particularly that as related to the foreign 
exchange market.  
 
Six Markets Group. The Four Markets Group upgraded to the Six Markets Group in March 
1997, with the addition of US and Chinese membership. It is said that this upgrade was 
organized by the US (Ostly, 1997). The then-Vice Finance Minister for International Finance, 
Katō Toshihiko, who chaired the first Six Markets Group meeting, also recalls that the US 
                                               
37 Fujioka served as the fourth ADB President between 1981 and 1989.  
38 Nihon Kinyū Tsūshin, January 26, 1981.  
39 The article in Far Eastern Economic Review on October 17, 1991 is perhaps the only article that touched on EMEAP. 
However, the article did not even mention the name “EMEAP” and it mistakenly reported that the meeting was an annual 
event. 
40 Australian Financial Review, February 26, 1997.  
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“heard” of the existence of the Four Markets Group and joined the group (Katō et al., 2002). 
The US did not consider the group useful, unlike APEC, but decided to join because it did 
not want to be excluded from regional financial cooperation.41  
 
While the Six Markets Group was called the “Asian G7,”42 MOF lost interest in the Group. 
Since the third Six Markets Group meeting in February 1999, no further meetings have been 
held. What is interesting is that MOF revived the Four Markets Group in September 1999, 
successfully excluding the US and China.43 The revived Four Markets Group produced a 
study on the development of regional bond markets and regional credit-rating agencies. 
However, after the prospect of the ASEAN+3 financial process became promising around 
2000, MOF seems to have prioritized the ASEAN+3 over the Four Markets Group.   
 
APEC Finance Ministers’ Meeting (APEC FMM). The US proposed to establish the 
APEC Finance Ministers’ process at the first APEC Summit in 1993 in Seattle. The first 
APEC FMM was held in Honolulu in March 1994, with an understanding among concerned 
parties that it was a one-time only event. While APEC’s Asian members, including Japan, 
were reluctant to annualize it, US officials unofficially expressed the view that regular 
hosting of APEC FMM was desirable.44 The US prioritized the annualization of APEC 
FMM, and decided against urging Asian countries to liberalize financial markets.45 As a 
result, annualization of the APEC FMM was agreed upon.  
 
The establishment of the APEC FMM precipitated the MOF’s anxiety. A Sankei editorial 
argued that the US would directly lead Asian countries in the Asia-Pacific financial 
framework, although Japan could have played some intermediate role between Asian and the 
US if there had been no such framework.46 In fact, soon after the establishment of APEC 
FMM, MOF founded the Japan-ASEAN FMM. Funabashi (1995, p. 214) observes that MOF 
was more interested in strengthening ties with its counterparts in ASEAN countries than 
supporting an APEC finance process.  
 
Asian Monetary Fund (AMF). While it is not widely known, the origin of AMF dates back 
before the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Kuroda (a senior MOF official) hit upon the idea of 
creating a regional monetary fund, when Fraser proposed the Asian version of BIS in 
September 1995 (Kuroda, 2004, p. 98). MOF planned to propose an AMF, at the margin of 
ADB annual meeting in May 1997, but postponed doing so. During the financial crisis, at 
the Thai rescue meeting held in Tokyo in August 1997, certain Asian countries47 agreed to 
contribute; the US refused to do so, despite its presence in the meeting. Japan planned to 
establish the AMF with contributors of the Thai package; the fact that the US did not 
contribute was used by Japanese officials as a good excuse to exclude the US. In September, 
Japan sent out invitations to discuss the AMF to all prospective members; the US was not 
included in the recipient list.  
 
Manila Framework Group (MFG). The US obtained the unofficial outline paper on the 
AMF somehow and insisted upon participating in the AMF preparatory meeting as an 
observer. At the meeting, the US expressed strong objection to the AMF, and made a counter-
                                               
41 Korean Economic Review, March 13, 1997.  
42 Yomiuri Shimbun, March 6, 1997.  
43 Nikkei Shimbun, August 22, 1999.  
44 Financial Times, March 21, 1994; Sankei Shimbun, March 10, 1994.  
45 Yomiuri Shimbun, March 23, 1994.  
46 Sankei Shimbun, January 17, 1994.  
47 Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, South Korea, China, Hong Kong and Australia. 
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proposal to establish the MFG,48 reflecting the US intention to thwart the idea of an Asian-
only group led by Japan. According to Blustein (2001, p. 168), Mr. Geithner, of the US 
Treasury, prepared an internal report in which he argued that some arrangement is necessary 
to avoid an Asian-only group. MOF officials felt that the intent of the MFG proposal was to 
block the creation of the AMF (Kuroda, 2004, p. 104). It should be noted that the US opposed 
the creation of the AMF, not the creation of a regional monetary fund per se. Fred Bergsten 
(1998) clearly argues for the usefulness of the Asia-Pacific Monetary Fund, including the 
US in its membership.  
 
ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers’ Meeting (ASEAN+3 FMM). At the second ASEAN+3 
Summit in December 1998, China proposed establishing the ASEAN+3 financial process.49 
The first ASEAN+3 FMM was held in April in Manila. At the third ASEAN+3 Summit in 
November 1999 in Manila, China proposed to regularize the meetings of the ASEAN+3 
FMM. Japan supported this proposal and the ASEAN+3 FMM was regularized (Kikuchi, 
2001, 23). Sakakibara (a senior MOFA official) explained, “I think that the era of APEC was 
already over. This is because APEC includes the US. However, ASEAN+3 does not include 
the US. Regional cooperation including the US is rarely meaningful, because the inclusion 
of the US is merely a synonym of global cooperation” (Sakakibara et al., 2001, p. 16). Under 
Japanese leadership, the financial regionalism project called the “Chiang Mai Initiative” 
(CMI), a web of swap agreements among financial authorities in the region, was agreed upon 
at the second ASEAN+3 FMM, held in May 2000 in Chiang Mai, Thailand.  
 
The US did not support the “independent” CMI and insisted that disbursement of CMI 
money should be linked with IMF conditionality. As a result, Asian countries would need to 
agree that only 10% of CMI’s total facilities could be disbursed without IMF involvement. 
The US position was that CMI should have consultative arrangements with the US and IMF 
(Henning, 2002, pp. 65-66). Meanwhile, China did not support independence of CMI. China 
insisted on a 100% linkage of CMI’s facilities with IMF (Amyx, 2004, p. 213). The “indirect” 
inclusion of the US in CMI was ideal for China, because it could thus avoid both the US- 
and Japanese-dominated frameworks.  
 
Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). China announced its AIIB proposal at the 
APEC Summit in Bali on October 8, 2013, during which the US president was absent. On 
the first evening of the ADB annual meeting on May 2, 2014, in Kazakhstan, delegates from 
16 countries skipped the scheduled dinner and joined a dinner organized by China to discuss 
the AIIB. The US, Japan and India were not invited to this dinner meeting.50 However, 
China invited India to join the AIIB in the following month and a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) was signed in Beijing on October 24, 2014. The MOU set the 
principal modality of the AIIB, including establishing the location of the headquarters in 
Beijing. China set the deadline for expressing interest in original membership in the AIIB as 
the end of March 2015, and more than 50 countries expressed their interest. Some European 
countries, including the UK, expressed interest, and Australia and South Korea eventually 
followed, despite US pressure not to join. China attempted to involve Japan in late 2014, 
when the institutional details of the AIIB were decided.51 However, together with the US, 
Japan decided to keep its distance from the AIIB.  
                                               
48 Japan, China, Hong Kong, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Philippines, Thailand, Australia, New 
Zealand, the US and Canada. 
49 Asahi Shimbun, December 17, 1998.  
50 Bloomberg, May 12, 2014.  
51 It is reported that China offered the vice president position to Japan (Nikkei Shimbun, April 14, 2014). 
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Trade Regionalism  
 
Intra-Regional Trade Promotion Talk (IRTPT). Japan launched the idea of creating 
IRTPT at the 1957 ECAFE session. IRTPT was a committee under ECAFE where trade 
experts from ECAFE’s regional members 52  could exchange views on regional trade 
facilitation. Huang (1975, p. 27) claims that the mandate of the IRTPT was to exclude non-
regional members of ECAFE. As Wightman (1963, p. 254) argues, Japan made this proposal 
mainly based on diplomatic considerations, because its idea for the IRTPT stemmed from 
the United Nations Bureau of MOFA, whereas its Economic Bureau and Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) were concerned more about the possible economic 
costs of IRTPT.  
 
The US expressed its “considerable doubts” as to the utility of IRTPT at the 1958 ECAFE 
session (ECAFE, 1958, p. 114). A vote was called for at the end of the session and the 
Japanese proposal was adopted, because all non-regional members other than Australia and 
New Zealand53 eventually abstained (Wightman, 1963, p. 254). This is mainly because of 
the Lahore Agreement adopted in the 1952 session, which is a kind of “gentlemen’s 
agreement” that non-regional members should abstain from remarks on regional cooperation 
among regional members (ibid.).  
 
Japan’s intentions with the IRTPT proposal were to create a trade forum, not an FTA. Japan 
made this point very clear at the 1958 ECAFE session (ECAFE, 1958, p. 103). However, 
Asian countries naturally requested Japan to increase imports of Southeast Asian products 
under the IRTPT scheme. For example, at the first IRTPT in 1959, Thailand and Burma urged 
Japan to buy their rice, while Japan rejected to do so (Wightman, 1963, p. 256). Partly 
because Japan was unable to satisfy these Asian countries’ requests, IRTPT lost momentum 
by the early 1960s.  
 
Organization for Asian Economic Cooperation (OAEC). The ECAFE Executive 
Secretary convened a consultative group of experts in 1961 to further study measures to 
facilitate regional trade. The group recommended the establishment of the OAEC, which 
was expected to have a strong institutional framework including headquarters, unlike the 
IRTPT, but its membership was limited to the regional members of ECAFE just like the 
IRTPT (Singh, 1966, p. 159). In January 1962, ECAFE sent out the OAEC proposal to 
ECAFE regional members, but the UK obtained the proposal on behalf of Hong Kong, and 
shared it with the US. The US subsequently questioned the Executive Secretary’s wisdom in 
excluding non-regional members (Singh, 1966, p. 160). At a high ranking officials’ meeting 
between Japan and the US, Mr. Doherty, an American representative, insisted that the OAEC 
could be viewed as exclusionary and thus the inclusion of a non-regional member was 
essential (Gaimushō, 1962a).  
 
Japanese policymakers’ views on OAEC were “hopelessly divided,” as Singh (1966, p. 160) 
and Korhonen (1994, p. 122) suggest. Striking a proper balance between diplomatic benefits 
and economic costs of the OAEC were very difficult. The documents produced at the British 
Embassy in Tokyo argued that for those Japanese officials still opposed to the establishment 
of an exclusively Asian group from which Japan might be under pressure to provide funds, 
                                               
52 In 1957, the US, the UK, France, the Netherlands, the USSR, Australia and New Zealand were non-regional members 
of ECAFE (Singh, 1966, p. 44).  
53 In 1963, Australia and New Zealand became regional members.  
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OAEC may be intriguing from a diplomatic perspective (British Embassy in Tokyo, 1962). 
At the cabinet meeting in February 1962, Foreign Minister Kosaka Zentarō expressed 
positive views on OAEC, while other ministers were critical of his comments.54 The final 
decision of the Ikeda Administration was that Japan would not support OAEC, because it 
would result in pressure on Japan to import primary products and damage domestic 
agriculture. 55 Kōno Ichirō, the then-Agriculture Minister, strongly opposed it (Hoshiro, 
2005). The explanation of Ōkita (1962, p. 32) regarding Japan’s perception of OAEC is 
plausible, stating that OAEC was rejected because there was a misunderstanding that OAEC 
would develop as an FTA.  
 
Japan-Southeast Asia Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA). When he assumed the Office 
of Foreign Minister in 1966, Miki Takeo advocated in favor of the Asia-Pacific Sphere policy. 
He instructed MOFA officials to examine possible options for his policy.56 MOFA was of 
the view that the creation of a Japan-Southeast Asia PTA was the ideal option, and 
domestically launched the idea in March 1967. The PTA would mainly cover agricultural 
and light industrial products, and the countries covered by the PTA were Southeast Asian 
countries- Taiwan and South Korea. 57 When Miki sounded the idea of the PTA at the 
MCEDSEA meeting in April 1967, Southeast Asian countries strongly urged the realization 
of the plan.58  
 
However, the Japan-Southeast Asia PTA did not become an official proposal of the Japanese 
government, and the idea faded away. When MOFA launched the idea of the PTA, a Nikkei 
editorial immediately pointed out that Japan’s interest was in non-discriminatory trade and 
that the provision of preferential treatment to Southeast Asian products was difficult, due to 
the possible damage to Japan’s light industries and to the negative impact on domestic small- 
and medium-sized enterprises.59  
 
Pacific Free Trade Area (PAFTA). After the failure of the PTA project, Miki realized the 
limited capacity of Japan to solve the development problems in Asia. In mid-1967, Miki 
finally outlined the elements of the Asia-Pacific Sphere policy in his speech at the Japan 
Committee for Economic Development (Keizai Dōyūkai) on May 22, 1967. One of the most 
important elements was to promote an awareness of a shared destiny among Asian and 
Pacific countries, and to solve North-South problems in the context of the Asia-Pacific 
region (Terada, 1998, p. 342). Meanwhile, Kojima Kiyoshi, a professor at Hitotsubashi 
University, proposed the formation of PAFTA, consisting of Japan, the US, Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand, as early as 1965.  
 
Partly as a result of Miki’s advocacy of the Asia-Pacific Sphere policy, the Japan Economic 
Research Center held the Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD) in 1968 
with financial assistance from the MOFA. The purpose of the conference was to examine the 
feasibility of the PAFTA proposal, and it was attended by economists from the five 
prospective members, including the US. The participants reached a consensus that the 
formation of PAFTA was premature (Cooper, 1968). The MOFA also held a negative view 
of PAFTA. A senior MOFA official argued that the inclusion of the US in trade regionalism 
would lead to an increase in US influence on regional economic cooperation (Katō, 1967, p. 
                                               
54 Nikkei Shimbun, February 7, 1962, evening edition.  
55 Yomiuri Shimbun, February 15, 1962, evening edition.  
56 Yomiuri Shimbun, December 22, 1966.  
57 Nikkei Shimbun, March 27, 1967, evening edition.  
58 Mainichi Shimbun, April 30, 1967.  
59 Nikkei Shimbun, March 27, 1967.  
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11).  
 
Asian Lóme Convention. Miki Takeo became Prime Minister in December 1974. Before 
attending the Rambouillet Summit in November 1975, Miki expressed the view that he 
would like to establish an Asian version of the Lóme Convention60 (Nakamura, 1981, 131). 
The Lóme scheme consisted of two components: (1) to provide non-reciprocal preferential 
treatment for primary products from developing members; (2) to establish the Stabilization 
of Export Earnings (STABEX) system that compensated developing members’ income from 
exports of primary products when the commodity price declined. According to Nakamura 
Keiichirō, who was a secretary to Miki, MOFA was very supportive of the Asian Lóme 
proposal, though MOF was reluctant (ibid, 134).  
 
Because of the opposition from MOF, Miki did not launch the proposal at Rambouillet, but 
the idea survived in ASEAN. The ASEAN Economic Ministers’ Meeting in June 1977 
reaffirmed the importance of realizing Asian Lóme Convention and decided to send joint 
delegations to Japan to discuss the issue in detail before Japan-ASEAN Summit planned in 
August 1977. 61  On 7 July, a meeting among director general officials from various 
ministries was held on this issue, and most officials were supportive of introducing the 
STABEX system,62 with a notable exception of MOF. Meanwhile all were reluctant to 
establish a regional PTA with ASEAN.63 The Nikkei article convincingly argued that the 
introduction of a regional PTA was difficult because it would damage Japan’s domestic 
producers, while providing aid through the STABEX system was easy because it would not 
entail domestic adjustments. Japanese government informed the ASEAN joint delegates on 
17 July that Japan disagreed with the formation of the Japan-ASEAN PTA, while it was 
prepared to study the STABEX system.64  
 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). During his state visit to the US in January 
1988, Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru was told by Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd 
that the US was planning to study a Japan-US FTA (Hatakeyama, 1996, p. 140). After 
Takeshita’s return to Japan, the Study Group on Asia-Pacific Trade and Development was 
formed and the “Sakamoto report” was delivered in June 1988.65 The report proposed to 
hold a ministerial meeting among Japan, the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Asian 
NICs and ASEAN countries in order to secure the US economic presence in Asia, with an 
expectation that the US would continue importing (Hatakeyama, 1996, p. 142). 66  The 
English version of the Sakamoto report was sent to the US and other prospective members 
(Krauss, 2000, p. 479). MITI suggested Australia should take the lead, however (Funabashi, 
1995, p. 61). Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke visited Seoul in January 1989, and 
launched the idea of regional cooperation in his speech. Hawke proposed to found an Asian 
OECD that aimed to establish a regular process of consultation and analysis on economic 
issues (Hawke, 1989, p. 6). It is said that Hawke listed ten countries as potential members of 
the institution: Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and the then-ASEAN 6 
(Ravenhill, 1998, p. 154). James Baker III, then the US Secretary of State, also recalls the 
                                               
60 The Lóme Convention was a trade agreement signed in 1975 by European countries and their former colonies. 
61 Nikkei Shimbun, June 30, 1977 
62 Only MOF displayed a cautious view on the proposed STABEX system.  
63 Nikkei Shimbun, July 8, 1977 
64 Asahi Shimbun, July 17, 1977. At the Summit Prime Minister Fukuda expressed his understanding to STABEX, bit not 
PTA (Asahi Shimbun, August 7, 1977). STABEX was not eventually established, partly because what was critical for 
ASEAN was PTA portion of Asian Lóme, not STABEX alone.  
65 The Study Group on the Japan-US FTA was also formed, but no concrete proposal was made.  
66 Hatakeyama took up the MITI Vice Minister position in 1991.  
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Hawke proposal did not include the US (Baker, 1995, p. 609).  
 
MITI disagreed with the non-inclusion of the US, and sent officials to Southeast Asia to 
lobby for US membership (Hatakeyama, 1996, p. 146). In March 1989, MITI Vice Minister 
Muraoka visited ASEAN and successfully persuaded counterparts that US membership was 
essential (Terada, 1999, p. 45). However, during Muraoka’s visit, MOFA quietly instructed 
its diplomats in Asian capitals to lobby against the MITI idea, because it questioned MITI’s 
emphasis of the importance of US membership in a regional grouping (Funabashi, 1995, p. 
61). Interestingly, similar disagreement also existed in the US. When Muraoka visited 
Washington, the US Trade Representative (USTR) and Department of Commerce were 
unenthusiastic about the proposal, but the State Department agreed with the plan (Terada, 
1999, p. 26). APEC was eventually organized in November 1989 as a ministerial meeting 
with participants from Japan, the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the then-ASEAN 
6.  
 
East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC). Mahathir bin Mohamad firstly publicized his idea 
about an East Asian Economic “Bloc,” when Chinese Premier Li Peng visited Malaysia in 
December 1990 (Hook, 1996, p. 194). Since the use of “bloc” was provocative, Noordin 
Sopiee proposed to re-name it the East Asian Economic “Group” (New Straits Times, 19 
January 1991, cited in Satō, 2003, p. 85). The prospective members were: Japan, the ASEAN 
states, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Vietnam (ibid.). The grouping was re-re-named the 
East Asian Economic “Caucus” at the ASEAN Economic Ministers’ Meeting in October 
1991. However, at the fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore in January 1992, no progress 
was made regarding the EAEC (Chalermpalanupap, 2002) because Indonesia did not support 
the EAEC idea.   
 
Reactions of both Japan and the US to EAEC were complex, because trade regionalism 
entails both economic and diplomatic aspects. In the case of the US, the Secretary of State, 
James Baker III, opposed EAEC immediately after he became aware of it (Funabashi, 1995, 
p. 206). In his memoir, Baker (1995, p. 610) confessed that he did his best to nullify the 
proposal. While the policy concerning EAEC was drawn up at the State Department, Baker’s 
position was not universally understood in the administration. Carla Hills, the then-USTR 
Representative expressed her understanding of EAEC, when she visited Southeast Asia in 
October 1991. The State Department officials made every effort to restrain Hills, who, 
according to these officials, lacked a strategic mind (Funabashi, 1995, p. 68). Similarly, the 
gap between diplomacy and economics existed in Japan. Michael Armacost, then the US 
Ambassador to Japan, observed that Japan economically preferred strong economic ties with 
the US, not a regional bloc, but the offer of leadership in an Asian regional arrangement 
exerted an undeniable attraction for many Japanese (Armacost, 1996, p. 154). MOFA 
officials were often inclined to support EAEC (Funabashi 1995, p. 208). MOFA’s Southeast 
Asian Division considered EAEC useful because its rival, APEC, could undermine Japan’s 
special economic and political relationships with ASEAN (Hook et al., 2001, p. 190). In 
contrast, Nakao Eiichi, the MITI Minister, argued on May 3, 1991, that the core of regional 
cooperation should be APEC, and expressed strong concerns about EAEG on the grounds 
that it excluded the US. 67  The Miyazawa Administration, who came into power on 
November 5, 1991, decided at a cabinet meeting that Japan would support EAEC only when 
it attains membership within APEC.68  
 
                                               
67 Nikkei Shimbun, May 5, 1991.  
68 Nikkei Shimbun, November 25, 1991.  
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East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA). In November 2004, China proposed conducting a 
study on EAFTA among ASEAN+3, and the study was started in April 2005. Meanwhile, 
Japan proposed a study on the Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA) 
among ASEAN+6 in August 2006. The CEPEA study was finalized by July 2009, just one 
month after the completion the EAFTA study. Both the results of the CEPEA study were 
reported to the ASEAN+6 FMM and those of the EAFTA study to the ASEAN+3 FMM in 
August 2009. The two proposals are very different from each other. First, EAFTA is a project 
among ASEAN+3 members, while CEPEA comprises the members of ASEAN+6. China 
thought a more narrow membership excluding Australia (a US ally) and India would make 
it more convenient for China to assume leadership. Japan considered the inclusion of 
Australia and India necessary to dilute China’s influence, a requisite condition for its 
leadership of the group. Second, China’s proposal emphasizes liberalization of trade in 
goods, while the Japanese proposal emphasizes non-goods issues, such as investment and 
intellectual property. In August 2011, China and Japan made a joint proposal on East Asian 
economic cooperation. They suggested the establishment of Working Groups, where both 
EAFTA and CEPEA could be discussed, eventually leading to the launch of the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiation in November 2012. These 
negotiations have not been concluded yet, and it is unclear whether Japan has genuine 
interest in it.69 
 
Conclusion: Beyond Asia-Pacific   
 
Because the proposed theory is generally supported by the empirical examination of regional 
group formation in Asia-Pacific mainly led by Japan, it is interesting to consider whether it 
can also explain regionalism elsewhere. It is worth examining the regionalism policy of 
China, which can be a leader in an Asia-only group, replacing Japan. Brazil’s regionalism 
policy is also interesting, because the rivalry between South America, led by Brazil, and a 
geographically wider cooperation led by the US. The proposed theory would also provide an 
alternative explanation to European regionalism, different from conventional views.   
 
China-led Asia. While China did not support Asian groupings led by Japan (such as AMF), 
the country became very proactive in forming Asian groups, once overtaking Japan. In the 
diplomatic field, China has been a proponent of Asia-only summits and did not support the 
inclusion of the US in EAS, valuing the ASEAN+3 Summit over EAS, once the US was 
included as an observer. In the field of finance, China established AIIB, excluding the US. 
In the trade field, China has pursued two groupings which exclude the US: EAFTA and RCEP, 
the latter being regarded as a rival proposal to the US-led TPP.  
 
Interestingly, Japan insisted on US participation in EAS, and decided against participating 
in AIIB together with the US. The country had/has a cautious attitude to EAFTA/RCEP, 
while it did decide to join the US-led TPP. These deviant cases imply the validity of the 
proposed theory. The relative decline of Japan vis-à-vis China seems to explain the change 
in Japan’s behavioral pattern. It is now China, not Japan, which holds the leading position 
in the formation of an Asia-only group.  
 
Brazil-led South America. The US initiated the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) in 1994 and then proposed to extend the FTA to Latin America through the Free 
                                               
69 It is very clear that Japan prioritized TPP negotiation over RCEP. It is argued that Japan agreed to launch RCEP 
negotiations to show its “China card” to the US, when Japan’s negotiation for TPP membership was in a critical stage. See 
Hamanaka (2014).   
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Trade Area of Americas (FTAA). Alternatively, Brazil initiated Mercosur, consisting of only 
South American countries. In the field of diplomacy, the Union of South American Nations 
(UNASUR), established in 2008 and comprising only South American countries, is an 
example of a Brazil-led organization excluding the US. The regionalism policy of Brazil is 
promotion of South American regionalism in which Brazil can hold the leading position, not 
that of Pan-American regionalism which may be dominated by the US. South American and 
Pan-American (Western hemisphere) regionalisms are competing, like Asian and Asia-
Pacific regionalisms.  
 
France-led Europe. There are various ways to explain European regionalism: realism 
(balance against the Soviet Union), institutionalism (policy coordination), and 
constructivism (European identity). The RGF theory explains European regionalism as a 
method employed mainly by France to exclude the US, and to a lesser extent, the UK. While 
the UK hesitated to join European regionalism, it is also true that France attempted to exclude 
the US and the UK. The inclusion of the UK and the US in regionalism would have led to 
an American- or British-dominated regionalism project, as Beloff (1963, p. 15) argues in his 
book entitled The General Says No: Britain’s Exclusion from Europe. European regionalism 
and North Atlantic regionalism competed, and France chose the former (Asmus, 2005, p. 
95). The relationship between the two regionalisms is similar to that between Asia and Asia-
Pacific. Inclusion of the US has been the common problem for both Europeans and Asians.  
 
Finally, it is interesting to consider how RGF theory can be developed in the future for wider 
application. As has been discussed, while it approaches institution-building from the supply-
side, the demand and supply should match when they reach institutional equilibrium. Factors 
emphasized by realists and institutionalists such as threat and economic benefits could 
explain a general status of demand for institutions in the region. For example, Japan’s desire 
to supply and lead a regional group in finance matched the demand for a financial 
cooperation mechanism among Southeast Asians soon after the financial crisis, resulting in 
ASEAN+3 FMM and CMI.  
 
At the same time, the specific status of each country’s demand also deserves close attention 
to further develop the theory. This means that the perspectives of follower countries should 
be included in the analytical setting. The follower countries include both countries that 
cannot be a leader because of geographical conditions (sounded by large countries, as is 
Mongolia between China and Russia) and countries that opt against becoming an actual 
leader (for example, Japan after the rise of China). The follower countries are in a position 
to choose a “boss.”70 This in turn means that potential leaders should be chosen to be an 
actual leader by their prospective followers. Because potential leaders need to be chosen, 
they need to behave benevolently. Moreover, followers may decide against choosing one 
leader, and counter-propose a regional group that includes two leaders, wherein their 
influences cancel each other out.  
 
While acknowledging the importance of demand-side in explaining institutional equilibria, 
the RGF theory introduced in this paper provides us with new insight into regional 
institution-building from the perspective of potential suppliers or leaders, a perspective 
which has been largely neglected in existing literature. We should also not overlook a 
potential leader’s purpose in establishing regional groups or institutions as part of realizing 
an ambition to become an actual leader by effectively excluding rivals.    
                                               
70 For example, after the decline, Japan is now in a position to choose either a group led by the US or that led by China. 
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